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The current Ebola virus epidemic is unprecedented in
scope, affecting 9178 individuals with transmission from
individuals infected in West Africa to health-care workers
(HCW) in the United States and Europe (1). Although
transmission via organ transplantation has not occurred, it is
important for the transplant community to recognize risk
factors for Ebola virus disease (EVD) among potential
donors to avoid this occurrence.
Symptomatic patients have virus disseminated in multiple
organs and body fluids, and transmission occurs via contact
with infected fluids (2). It is plausible, however, that organ
donors might be infectious prior to the development of
symptoms; donors with other asymptomatic infections
(e.g. lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus) have transmitted
infection to recipients (3). Donor-derived infection (DDI)
could involve a donor who died of unrecognized EVD, or
more likely an infected but not yet symptomatic donor.
These potential donors could be residents of outbreak
countries traveling to the United States, Americanworkers/
military personnel returning from areas of active EVD, or
contacts of EVD patients in the United States.
The consequences of such a transmission, however
unlikely, would be potentially grave. Not only would one
expect Ebola virus transmitted to multiple immunosup-
pressed recipients to have a high mortality rate, but, in
contrast to virtually all other instances of DDI, the
implications for public health and exposed HCW would
be significant. EVD would not be considered until multiple
recipients developed disease, alerting those caring for the
recipients to suspect DDI. An investigation would likely
ensue, and could require significant time to make the
correct diagnosis depending on when the donor’s connec-
tion to EVD was suspected. Exposed individuals could
include operating roompersonal andmedical workers in the
donor’s hospital, as well as HCW, visitors, and perhaps
other patients at recipient hospitals. While universal
precautions are standard, recent events have demonstrat-
ed that these are not adequate to protect HCW. Adding to
the potential impact, it is quite conceivable that heavily
immunosuppressed recipients dying of unrecognized EVD
would require intensive medical care in the setting of very
high viral loads and be especially contagious.
An assessment of whether or not an organ from a donor at
increased risk of transmitting an infection should be used
relies on balancing the risk of transmittable disease
combined with the consequences of transmission (e.g. is
the transmitted disease treatable?) against the urgency of
need for transplantation. For example, most surgeons
would accept a Public Health Service increased risk donor
whose risk factor was brief incarceration 9 months prior for
a potential adult liver recipient with a high Model for End-
Stage Liver Disease score. In most scenarios associated
with an increased risk for transmission of DDI, the recipient
participates in the decision through the informed consent
process. In the case of Ebola, however, the willingness to
accept this risk to gain the benefit of an organ is likely
outweighed by the risk of spreading the virus to HCW and
other contacts in the absence of a proven treatment and an
almost certain transplant associated mortality. This risk to
others cannot be resolved using informed consent.
Screening must be structured to minimize organ wastage.
Given limited availability and poor sensitivity during the
incubation period, laboratory testing is not likely to be useful
as a screening tool to exclude transmissible infection.
Rather, assessment of epidemiological risk factors is
required. The European Union has taken a conservative
approach, excluding from donation of blood or any
‘‘substance of human origin’’ for 60 days after returning
from an area of EVD activity or other known exposure, with
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an exception of 1 month in the case of ‘‘urgent need for
organ transplantation’’ if negative Ebola virus nucleic-acid
amplification testing is performed (2, p. 2). In the United
States, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network/United Network for Organ Sharing Ad Hoc
Disease Transmission Advisory Committee has provided
some guidance regarding the risk of donor-derived EVD (4).
We believe that until the EVD outbreak ends, a simple
assessment of all potential donors (living or deceased) for
risk factors is appropriate. These risk factors include the
following:
 Travel in the previous 21 days to an area of significant
EVD activity
 HCW working directly with EVD patients in the past
21 days
 Others (e.g. family members) with direct exposure to a
patient with proven EVD in the past 21 days.
Obtaining this information should not be a significant
burden. Most organ procurement organizations are already
obtaining travel history and the Uniform Donor Risk
Assessment Interview includes a question regarding the
specifics of travel. Notably, travel to other parts of Africa,
foreign travel in general, or working in healthcare (without
EVD exposure) does not create risk. Similarly, contacts of
asymptomatic individuals exposed to EVD would not be
considered at risk.
The approach suggested above may not identify all donors
at risk for transmitting EVD. Asymptomatic infection with
Ebola virus occurs, and those that recover from EVD may
shed virus for prolonged periods of time (5,6). It is not
known how long potential donors in either situation have
infectious virus in organs. Thus, while we feel that a 21-day
exclusion is a reasonable starting point, each offer should
be evaluated individually assessing urgency of recipient
need, obtaining recipient informed consent, and alerting
centers to monitor for recipient clinical findings suggestive
of EVD. Serial testing for EVD in the recipient could be
considered aswell. Further, potential donors (or their family
members) may not be aware of specific exposures.
These concerns during the Ebola outbreak should not
impede our ability to deliver vital organs to patients in need.
With appropriate screening of donors, we canminimize risk
for Ebola transmission with little impact on the donor pool.
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